Lukacs ~ History & Consciousness by Higgins, Winton
lUKQOS ~
h is to r y  &
consciousness
W IN T O N  H IG G IN S
“The strength of every society is in the last resort a 
spiritual strength. And from this we can only be libera­
ted by knowledge. This knowledge cannot be of the 
abstract kind that remains in one’s head. It  must be 
flesh of one’s flesh, and blood of one’s blood; to use 
Marx's phrase, it must be ‘practical critical activity’. ”
- GEORG LUKACS.
A list of the best-known contributors to marxist theo­
ry would surely have to include George Lukacs’ name in 
a prominent position. Yet his contribution remains sha­
dowy and paradoxical, due not only to the fact that it 
spans over five decades and incorporates many shifts of 
fortune and party lines, but also to the fact that it 
spans many disciplines - philosophy, aesthetics, sociol­
ogy and politics.
Lukacs was bom in 1885, the son of a successful 
Budapest banker, and his early milieu was the upper 
middle class in that city. His preoccupations with aes­
thetics and philosophy meant that his first contact with 
marxism was a purely intellectual one. Towards the end 
of the first world war he became convinced that marx­
ism represented the culmination of western philosophy. 
There were two reasons for this. Firstly, it took over 
Hegel’s achievement of overcoming what Lukacs calls 
“the antinomies of bourgeois thought,” meaning the 
irreducibility of such categories as “is” and “ought” , 
subject and object, etc. - categories that underpin most 
non-marxist philosophy and social science to this day. 
Secondly, marxism transcended the abstract idealism of 
Hegel’s system itself, and thus held the promise of phi­
losophy fulfilling itself in practice, in social change.
This realisation about marxism led Lukacs to become 
politically committed, since it is above all a philosophy 
of action, of praxis. He became politically active, and 
in 1919 he was Deputy Commissar for Culture in the 
short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic. Its collapse, and
his subsequent exile abroad, established a pattern in 
Lukacs’ political career: his appearances in this arena - 
in the ’twenties in the international communist move­
ment, and for a few days in Imre Nagy’s revolutionary 
government in 1956 - were to be few, brief, unsucces­
sful, and punctuated by long periods of exile. His im­
portance lies wholly in his theoretical contribution, 
which itself could not escape the deformations which 
are inevitable in the absence of practical involvement 
in real political struggles. From the mid-’twenties on, 
there was a second deforming influence on his theore­
tical activity: the need to follow the zigs and zags of 
the party line under an unfree regime in which the 
function of that party line was, among other things, 
to cover a multitude of Stalinist sins - opportunism, 
terror, and philistinism.
In this article 1 am concerned with History and Class 
Consciousness, which is unquestionably Lukacs’ most 
influential book, and is the reason for the current re­
vival of interest in him as a political thinker. This book 
is made up of essays written in exile between 1919 
and 1922 and was first published in 1923. It is there­
fore the fruit of several years’ political involvement, 
and yet it is the product of philosophical inquiry as 
yet free from the Stalinist terror.
History and Class Consciousness does not seek to add 
to the marxist tradition: on the contrary, it is a major 
enterprise of restoration; in it Lukacs seeks to expound 
its fundamental propositions and point out precisely 
why it represents the culmination of modem philosophy. 
Two major themes run throughout the work: firstly, 
the way in which marxism has surpassed earlier philo­
sophical systems and remains the only system capable 
of comprehending history and guiding men’s activity 
in creating history; secondly, Lukacs attacks certain 
vulgarisations of the tradition, such as economism and
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scientism, which were prevalent in his time -- and still 
are today.
This second theme represented an important correct­
ive. Even though Marx himself had heavily criticised 
traditional materialism, there can be no doubt that, at 
the time Lukacs was writing, the mainstream of marx­
ism had collapsed back into it, and the emphasis on 
dialectical method and praxis had been lost. Among im­
portant marxists, only Rosa Luxemburg and Trotsky 
had remained entirely outside this mainstream, and the 
only adequate statement of Marx’s historical material­
ism had been that of Antonio Labriola. The restorative 
work which Lukacs started was later to be carried much 
further in Gramsci’s writings.
In the first part of this article, I shall attempt to sum­
marise some of the ideas in History and Class Conscious­
ness which come close to the problems facing us today.
In the second part, I shall discuss how these ideas dif­
fer from Marx’s own account. Thirdly, I shall attempt 
to point to the deficiencies in Lukacs’ system and ten­
tatively suggest how they are to be overcome.
I.
History and Class Consciousness is a dense and ency­
clopaedic work. It contains a theory of history and of 
the role of consciousness in the revolutionary process, 
a history of philosophy and an elaboration of the marx- 
ist theory of knowledge, the role of the party and the 
state. This attempt to draw out of it those ideas that 
are directly concerned with a theory of revolution can­
not avoid doing some violence to the balance and com­
pleteness of the book itself.
Marxism is more than an alternative social theory or 
political program. It is an original and autonomous 
conception of the world, made up of categories which 
are peculiar to it and bear the stamp of its historical 
dimension. Lukacs sees the marxist theory of history as 
encapsulated in the oft-quoted aphorism from The Eight­
eenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte-. “Men make their 
own history, but they do not make it as they may 
please.” For Lukacs, history is first of all conscious hu­
man activity. “Conscious” in this context means no 
more than “deliberate,” since all historical activity hither­
to has been directed by a necessarily impaired vision -- a 
false consciousness - of the social process in its totality. 
The second aspect of history is an objective one: “the 
succession of those processes in which the forms taken 
by this activity and the relations of man to himself (to 
nature, to other men) are overthrown.” (History and 
Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics, 
[H.C.C.], Merlin, London, 1971, p. 186.)
History is, then, the mutual interaction between deli­
berate human action and objective circumstances, and 
can only be grasped in terms of a dialectical method, 
using categories adequate to that method. Lukacs quotes 
Marx’s dictum in his A Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy:
“ In the study of economic categories, as in the case of 
every historical and social science, it must be borne in 
mind that the categories are therefore but forms of be­
ing, conditions of existence. ”
and notes that the essential determinants of dialectics 
(“the interaction of subject and object, the unity of 
theory and practice* the historical changes underlying the 
categories as the root cause of changes in thought, etc. ') 
(H.C.C. p. 24, note 6) apply only to social reality -- the 
realm of conscious human activity -- and not to nature.
The return to a dialectical perspective is basic to Lukacs’ 
notion of “orthodox marxism,” an orthodoxy he defines 
exclusively in terms of method. This return leads him to 
emphasise two categories fundamental to dialectics -- 
“totality” and “mediation.”
The category of totality embodies the unity of the his­
torical process. Marx notes:
“The result we arrive at is not that production, distri­
bution, exchange and consumption are identical, but that 
they are all members of one totality... Thus a definite 
form of production determines definite forms of consum­
ption, distribution and exchange as well as definite rela­
tions between these different elements... A mutual inter­
action takes place between these various elements. This 
is the case with every organic body.” (Critique.)
For Lukacs, this concept of totality is a crucial feature 
of the marxist method:
“ It is not the primacy of economic motives in histori­
cal explanations that constitutes the decisive difference 
between marxism and bourgeois thought, but the point 
of view of the totality. The category of totality, the all- 
pervasive supremacy of the whole over the parts, is the 
essence of the method which Marx took over from He­
gel and brilliantly transformed into the foundation of 
a wholly new science.” (H.C.C., p. 27.)
Lukacs’ rejection of economic determinism is clear from 
this passage, and from this standpoint of the totality he 
launches his attack on both economism and bourgeois 
thought.
But the relationships between social phenomena 
(which is the same as their relation to the social total­
ity) are not immediately obvious, and the immediacy 
of their appearance must be overcome if the total 
structure is to be revealed. The category of mediation 
is the “lever with which to overcome the mere imme­
diacy of the empirical world and as such is not some­
thing (subjective) foisted onto objects from outside, 
it is no value judgment, or ‘ought’ opposed to their 
‘is.’ It is rather the manifestation of their authentic; 
objective character.” (H.C.C., p. 162.) Mediations 
reveal the relation between a thing and the totality: 
it reveals in social phenomena what to a marxist is 
their essential nature: their place in the total structure 
of society.
Both categories are essential for grasping what Lu­
kacs calls the “concrete reality” of social phenomena, 
the structural meaning of objects. But unlike bourg­
eois thinkers, he denies a rigid separation between per- 
ceiver and perceived. Starting with Hegel’s formula 
that “truth must be understood not merely as substance, 
but also as subject,” Lukacs affirms Marx’s thesis that 
perception involved the practical sensuous activity of 
the perceiver, the subject, such that consciousness chan­
ges the object and does not merely reflect it. Subject 
and object are unified in a total process which overcomes 
“the reified disintegration of the subject, and the -- like­
wise reified -- rigidity and impenetrability of its objects” 
(H.C.C., p. 140.) Here, too, Lukacs distances himself 
from both bourgeois thought and vulgar marxist “scient­
ism” which posit an “objective” reality free from sub­
jective intervention.
What are the implications for the materialist conception 
of history of this renovation of dialectical method?To 
answer this question, we must refer to the statement in 
the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Politic­
al Economy:
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“ It is not the consciousness of men that determines 
their social being but, on the contrary, their social being 
that determines their consciousness.”
If “social being” is interpreted passively so as to treat 
man simply as the object of the social process, a mecha­
nistic (and therefore false) view of the social process re­
sults. Lukacs emphasises that man is both the subject 
and the object of this process, that “social being” is no­
thing but the practical activity of men, within social re­
lations that are themselves a human product. The active 
sense of both being and consciousness is the basis upon 
which Marx criticised Feuerbach’s materialism:
“The materialist doctrine that men are the product of 
circumstances and education, that changed men are 
therefore the product of other circumstances and of a 
different education, forgets that circumstances are in 
fact changed by men and that the educator must him­
self be educated.” (3rd Thesis).
Lukacs criticises economism for this same “forgetfulness^ 
The above is a summary of the method Lukacs calls or­
thodox marxism, or historical materialism. What is the 
method for? He opens his book on Lenin with the def­
inition: “Historical materialism is the theory of the 
proletarian revolution.” Although this is rather too simple 
to encapsulate its meaning in History and Class Consc­
iousness, it is its point of departure from the formal dis­
ciplines of philosophy and history. Their irrelevance as a 
guide to human action was acknowledged by Hegel:
“When philosophy paints its gloomy picture a form of 
life has grown old. It cannot be rejuvenated by the gloomy 
picture, but only understood. Only when the dusk starts 
to fall does the owl of Minerva spread its wings and fly.” 
(quoted in HCC, p.59).
The philosopher arrives after the event -- "post festum”, 
as Marx puts it - and his consciousness is “subsequent 
consciousness” . This tardiness means for Lukacs that 
“the real motor forces of history are independent of 
men’s (psychological) consciousness of them” . (HCC, 
p.47).
We have seen that man is the subject and object of the 
historical process, but false consciousness as to his role 
in the process or the nature of the process itself prevents 
him from achieving his subjective goals. True conscious­
ness, on the other hand, means both self-knowledge and 
a correct perception of concrete reality. If truth is not 
only substance but subject, as Hegel says, the precondit­
ion of a true consciousness capable of guiding (not just 
explaining the event) historical actions is the existence 
of a self-knowing, identical subject-object.
In marxist theory, the human subject materialises in the 
form of social classes, which are both created in the soc­
ial process and are in turn the motors of it. The consc­
iousness of a class is therefore the only historically sig­
nificant consciousness in class society,. Lukacs says that 
if the realm of freedom is to be realised “the emergence of 
consciousness must become the decisive step which the 
historical process must take towards its proper end” .
(HCC, p.2). Class consciousness is defined as consisting 
of:
“ the appropriate and rational reactions ‘imputed’ to a 
particular typical position in the process of production. 
This consciousness is, therefore, neither the sum nor the 
average of what is thought or felt by the single individ­
uals who make up the class. And yet the historically sig­
nificant actions of the class as a whole are determined 
in the last resort by this consciousness and not by the 
thought of the individual -- and these actions can be un­
derstood only by reference to this consciousness.” (HCC, 
p.51).
Lukacs, with Lenin, raises a distinction between the 
actual or empirical consciousness of the members of a 
class on the one hand, and true class consciousness, the 
rational response to social reality, as it can be gleaned 
from the “vantage point” of a particular class, on the 
other.
By no means every class is capable of a class conscious­
ness able to move history, for “class consciousness im­
plies a conditioned unconsciousness of one’s own socio- 
historical and economic conditions” , so that “if from 
the vantage point of a particular class the totality of ex­
isting society is not visible.... then such a class is doomed
to play a subordinate role. It can never influence the 
course of history” . (HCC, p.52).
The ability to influence the course of history depends 
on the capacity of a class to exercise hegemony at a par­
ticular moment. It will only have this capacity if its in­
terests and consciousness “enable it to organise the whole 
of society in accordance with its interests” . (HCC,p.52).
A significant part of History and Class Consciousness 
is given over to establishing the point that the hegemony 
of the bourgeoisie is no longer viable, but I can only in­
dicate the line of argument here. Essentially restating 
Marx’s thesis in The German Ideology, Lukacs says:
“ For (the bourgeoisie) it is a matter of life or death to 
understand its own system of production in terms of et­
ernally valid categories: it must think of capitalism as 
being pre-destined to eternal survival by the eternal laws 
of nature and reason. Conversely, contradictions that can­
not be ignored must be shown to be purely surface phen­
omena, unrelated to this mode of production.” (HCC, 
pp.10-11).
Bourgeois thought, then, must lack the historical dim­
ension essential to an adequate comprehension of the 
age. The problem of the present is an historical problem, 
but as Marx says of bourgeois economics in The Poverty 
of Philosophy, “history existed once upon a time, but it 
does not exist any more” .
The necessity of the historical dimension arises from 
the fact that only here is the dialectical motion of the 
total process expressible. The denial of this totality sim­
ultaneously denies to empirical social phenomena the 
mediation that would allow us to understand their ess­
ential reality. Denied this mediation, social phenomena 
remain locked in their immediacy, and retain the isolat­
ion and opacity of “things-in-themselves” . For Lukacs, 
the isolated “thing-in-itself ’ - the Kantian noumenon - 
is the source of the irreducible antagonisms of bourgeois 
thought: subject and object, theory and practice, “is” 
and “ought” , etc.
The immediate thinghood of these “things-in-them­
selves” is reflected in the reified consciousness of the 
bourgeoisie, epitomised in the fetishism of commodities, 
whereby a real social relation between men (in Marx’s 
words) “assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a 
relation between things”.
Economic crisis represents the simultaneous objective 
and subjective breakdown of bourgeois society. It is 
here that the “eternal” laws of capitalist production and 
reproduction reach their historical limits, the operation­
al rationality of bourgeois economics is outflanked, and 
the reified mind is unable to perceive a pattern in the 
“chaos” , for “the qualitative existence of the ‘things’ 
that lead their lives beyond the purview of economics 
as misunderstood and neglected things-in-themselves
....... suddenly becomes the decisive factor”. (HCC,p,
105).
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When crisis overwhelms capitalist society, Lukacs re­
veals, in messianic fashion, that class “entrusted by his­
tory with the task of transforming society consciously,” 
since “the school of history confers upon it the leader­
ship of mankind” (HCC pp. 71 & 76): the proletariat. 
For the class situation of the proletariat is both the ne­
gation of capitalist society and the only vantage point 
from which its totality can be understood. As Marx 
puts it:
“ When the proletariat proclaims the dissolution of the 
old world-order it does no more than reveal the secret 
of its own existence, for it represents the effective dis­
solution of that world order.” (“Critique of Hegel’s Phi­
losophy of Right.” )
In order to understand its own nature and role in so­
ciety, the proletariat is forced to understand society as 
a whole. While the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are 
interdependent and both products and components of 
capitalist society, with the crisis of that society the pro­
letariat emerges as that class whose interests are those of 
society at large. It is this universality that signifies that 
when the proletariat “ finds itself,” history will have 
found the self-conscious subject-object capable of guid­
ing society by human rationality.
But even for Lukacs, the emergence of proletarian 
class consciousness is not so easy. The proletariat is it­
self subject to reified consciousness, and in the analysis 
of what he calls the proletariat’s “ideological crisis,” he 
comes close to Gramscis’s notion of hegemony. For the 
proletariat can see itself as a component of bourgeois 
society (a self-image promulgated by revisionist parties 
and many trade unions) or as the agent of its destruction. 
The ideological crisis of the proletariat consists in the 
struggle for self-education, for the overthrow of revi­
sionism and trade union consciousness which faithfully 
reflect the immediate experience of bourgeois life-forms 
(thereby obstructing the authentic self-mediation of the 
class and delivering it up to an unreconcilable antagon­
ism between theory and practice, thought and existence): 
“The proletariat can only be liberated from its depend­
ence on the life-forms created by capitalism when it has 
learnt to act without these life-forms inwardly influenc­
ing its actions. As motive forces they must sink to the 
status of matters of complete indifference... The self- 
education of the proletariat is a lengthy and difficult pro­
cess by which it becomes ‘ripe’ for revolution, and the 
more highly developed capitalism and bourgeois culture 
are in a country, the more arduous this process becomes 
because the proletariat becomes infected with the life 
forms of capitalism.” (HCC,p.264).
The ideological crisis of the proletariat is an “inward 
barrier” , but the reified forms of bourgeois life are not 
to be overcome in a merely theoretical manner. They 
only reflect the actual conditions of existence in bourg­
eois society, and the real task is the practical abolition 
of that society - a task which demands the unity of the­
ory and practice, realised in authentic revolutionary 
praxis.
In the proletariat’s struggle to achieve consciousness, 
the role played by the communist party becomes crucial. 
Quoting Lenin’s statement that “politics cannot be sep­
arated mechanically from organisation” , Lukacs points 
out that the party is no mere technical question, but 
is part and parcel of the theory of revolution. The ques­
tion “what then shall we do? ” demands an answer in 
terms of organisation. Lukacs relates the question to 
the socio-historical process in this way:
“ Organisation is the form of mediation between theory 
and practice. And, as in every dialectical relationship, 
the terms of the relation only acquire concreteness in 
and by virtue of this mediation.” (HCC,p.330).
When it comes to the likelihood or necessity of the pro­
letariat’s bridging the gap between empirical and “imput­
ed” class consciousness, Lukacs is highly problematical. 
He rejects the undialectical dichotomy between “ fatal­
ism” and “voluntarism” , but appears to waver between 
the two himself:
“The proletariat cannot abdicate its mission. The only 
question at issue is how much it has to suffer before it 
achieves ideological maturity, before it acquires a true 
understanding of its class situation, and a true class con­
sciousness.” (HCC,p. 76).
And later we find that proletarian class consciousness 
is “nothing but the expression of historical necessity” . 
(HCC,p.177). Yet “the aspiration (to grasp the truth) 
only yields the possibility. The accomplishment can on­
ly be the fruit of conscious deeds of the proletariat” . 
Moreover, “history is at its least automatic when it is 
the consciousness of the proletariat that is at issue” . 
(HCC,pp.73 & 208).
It is concerning the crucial question of economic crisis 
that the problematical nature of the proletariat’s ideo­
logical maturity comes to the fore. Lukacs suggests that 
“the active and practical side of class consciousness can 
emerge only in an acute crisis; but the proletariat must 
evidently be prepared in advance, since it is crucial whe­
ther it “experiences the crisis as the object or the subject 
of decision” . (HCC, p.244). As the subject of decision it 
will not make demands “but impose an effective reality” . 
As the object of decision, it will see capitalist society 
drag on, with the attendant possibility of a descent into 
barbarism:
“ Lenin has very rightly pointed out that there is no sit­
uation from which there is no way out. Whatever posit­
ion capitalism finds itself in there will always be some 
‘purely economic’ solutions available. The question is 
only whether these solutions will be viable when they 
emerge from the pure theoretical world of economics 
into the reality of the class struggle. Whether they can
be put into practice depends .......on the proletariat.”
(HCC, p.306).
n.
History and Class Consciousness is avowedly an attempt 
to interpret Marx’s theory of revolution, without revis­
ions or additions. It is hard to believe that Lukacs was 
unaware at the time that there is little or no warrant in 
Marx’s work for the leninist contribution concerning 
revolutionary consciousness and organisation, which is 
a vital part of the book. However, in this section I wish 
to show that the book is an imperfect account of Marx’s 
theory, notwithstanding its considerable contribution in 
correcting fundamental misconceptions that were more 
widespread in the marxist tradition that Lukacs’. The 
root of the problem is acknowledged by him in his self- 
critical Preface to the 1967 edition of the book: the fail­
ure to locate the proletariat’s experience and conscious­
ness in the labor process. His self-criticism, however, 
falls short.
Marx and Engels state:
“The production of ideas, conceptions, and conscious­
ness is at first directly interwoven with the material ac­
tivity and the material intercourse of men, the language 
of real life .... men are the producers of their conceptions,
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ideas, etc. -- real, active men as they are conditioned by
a definite development of their productive forces.....
Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious 
existence, and the existence of men is their actual life 
process.’’
* * * * *  * * * * * *
“This method of approach is not devoid of premisses.
It starts out from real premisses and does not abandon 
them for a moment. Its premisses are men, not in any 
fantastic isolation or rigidity, but in their actual, empir­
ically perceptible process of development under definite 
conditions. As soon as this active life-process is described, 
history ceases to be a collection of dead facts ... or an 
imagined activity of imagined subjects.” (The German 
Ideology, Lawrence and Wishart, pp. 47-8).
“Their actual life process” under capitalism is the lab­
our process. In the marxian scheme, the contradictions 
of capitalism are not a series of abstract propositions to 
be handed the worker to explain his life to him: they 
are existential realities that impinge upon him painfully 
in his daily life. Without this materialist base, the marx­
ian dialectic and its notion of praxis turn into their opp­
osite -- subjectivism - as Lukacs now admits. (HCC, pp. 
xvii - xviii).
In the result he ends up with an “historical necessity” 
profoundly different from Marx’s. The latter expresses 
the process of the emergence of revolutionary conscious­
ness as follows:
“ If socialist writers attribute this world-historical role 
to the proletariat this is not at all .... because they reg­
ard the proletarians as gods. On the contrary, in the fully 
developed proletariat everything human has been taken 
away .... Man has lost himself, but he has not only ac­
quired, at the same time, a theoretical consciousness of 
his loss, he has been forced by an ineluctible, irremed­
iable and imperious distress ~  by practical necessity -  to 
revolt against this inhumanity. It is for these reasons that 
the proletariat can and must emancipate itself .... It is not 
in vain that it passes through the rough but stimulating 
school of labour. It is not a matter of knowing what this 
or that proletarian, or even the proletariat as a whole, 
conceives as its aim at any particular moment. It is a ques­
tion of knowing what the proletariat is, and what it must 
accomplish in accordance with its nature. ” (The Holy 
Family).
“In this way Marx dethrones the Idea and replaces it 
with real men, abolishing Hegel’s metaphysical teleology. 
Lukacs, however, implicitly restores this teleology as his 
proletariat responds to the promptings of history (“ the 
school of history” rather than “the rough but stimulat­
ing school of labour” , etc.). Marx sets up the question - 
and provides an answer -- that Lukacs obscures: what is 
the process that generates actual revolutionary conscious­
ness in the proletariat?
But Lukacs also poses a problem that does not arise in 
Marx: how does the proletariat come to adopt its “im­
puted” class consciousness as its own -- a consciousness 
that arises independently of its social being? The ques­
tion cannot be answered in terms of historical material­
ism, since the concept of “imputed” class consciousness 
itself is an idealist construct, the opposite to Marx’s 
“conscious existence” .
Lacking any dialectical connection with the materialist 
base through social being, “imputed” class consciousness 
must be irrelevant to authentic praxis. Theory here div­
orces itself from practice, and in these circumstances, 
Lukacs’ notion of a “theory of praxis” becoming a
“practical theory” (HCC, p.205) is a contradiction in 
terms. By contrast, what Marx meant by praxis has been 
summed up as follows:
“Within a continuous historical process, in successive 
moments, men produce and are reproduced by new con­
ditions of existence. Through practical activity, through 
their daily involvement in the struggle for existence which 
is here a class struggle, men forge the instruments and 
opportunities for new thought and action. Revolution 
and revolutionary consciousness are the outcome of the 
actual interaction of subjective perceptions and object­
ive conditions within this process of struggle. Praxis is, 
in this case, the vehicle of interaction - the political 
struggle of classes, the experience of mobilisation and 
organisation which links conditions to consciousness in 
action. The theoretical determinancy of either conscious­
ness or the material bases of production does not in it­
self animate their relationship in the real world. On Marx’s 
terms, to rely on material forces of change exclusive of 
an active self-conscious human agency is to perpetuate 
men’s alienation in contradiction to men’s power; to 
rely on spontaneous human will for self-emancipation is 
to perpetuate false consciousness of men’s power.”
(Ann Bastian, Class Consciousness and Socialist Revol­
ution, unpublished M.Sc. dissertation, 1971, pp.10-11).
The disjunction between theory and practice not only 
destroys the basis for a meaningful praxis, but also fal­
sifies the role of the party: in Lukacs’ account, it becom­
es a self-generating sovereign, separate from and exercis­
ing tutelage over the proletariat, whose “conscious ex­
istence” has no determinant role in the relationship.
The similarity with stalinism is as obvious as the dep­
arture from the original marxian schema. In Part II of 
The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels set forth an
- admittedly embryonic -- model of an organic proletar­
ian party, organising around the oppression of the class. 
Lukacs’ model inevitably reduces itself to an elite org­
anising around what is its exclusive stock-in-trade, optim­
al consciousness. And so we find him taking to task one 
of his own important influences, Rosa Luxemburg, for 
saying:
“Let us speak plainly. Historically, the errors committed 
by a truly revolutionary movement are infinitely more 
fruitful and more valuable than the infallibility of the 
best of all ‘Central Committees’.” (Marxism or Leninism).
HI.
Historical materialism is concerned among other things 
with the question of how different ideologies arise out 
of the dialectical interaction between base and super­
structure, and how these ideologies in their tum become 
determinants in this interaction. Lukacs is correct in 
saying that historical materialism does not permit us to 
merely confront true and false consciousness: it requires 
us to investigate the content of all forms of consciousness 
and their origins in the total process, and that it can and 
must be applied to itself. We might now add that, after 
a period of over 120 years in which historical materialism 
has failed to decisively “seize the masses” in advanced 
capitalist societies, we should be seeking an explanation 
in its terms for this non-event, and we may well, in so 
doing, establish some guidelines for the theoretical and 
practical problems facing us. If we do apply historical 
materialism to itself (and this section can at best be only 
an indication of an outline of such a project) a pattern 
of the ups and downs of the doctrine, as scientific me­
thod and revolutionary ideology, may begin to emerge.
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Mid-nineteenth century capitalism, which provided the 
raw material for Marx’s analysis, had certain features 
which distinguish it from present-day capitalism. The 
conditions of productivity were lower, so that industry 
was far more labor-intensive, and the imperative of 
capital accumulation forced capitalists to rely more on 
absolute surplus-value. In social terms, this meant large 
concentrations of workers united in appalling working 
and living conditions, as the capitalists, driven by “the 
gales of competition,” attempted unceasingly to lower 
wages and extend the working day. The cyclical crises 
that inhere in the system were unsoftened by the stabi­
lising mechanisms later invented by bourgeois economics, 
and the former increased the distress, exacerbating the 
system’s tendency to produce an ever larger body of un­
employed. The superstructures of bourgeois society, es­
pecially on the continent, were undeveloped, incapable 
either of absorbing the blows dealt that society by cri­
ses, or of successfully imposing a false mediation between 
the real conditions of life and people’s perception of 
them. Bourgeois dominance appeared fragile.
In these circumstances, Marx’s writings on the dyna­
mics of revolution seem quite circumspect:Labriola 
pointed out that The Communist Manifesto, though 
written from the edge of the volcano of the 1848 revo­
lutionary upheavals, is no prophecy or promise of re­
volution, but a “morphological prevision”based upon 
the workings of the system itself. It was, in particular, 
not based upon any idea of the absolute impoverishment 
of the working class, but on the idea of a widening gulf 
between the socio-economic conditions of the two major 
classes, itself a systematic reflex of capitalist exploita­
tion.
However, from the late-nineteenth century on, a gradual 
change took place in the nature of capitalist society which 
altered the basis of the original analysis. The increasing pre­
ponderance of constant capital, bringing with it an enor­
mous increase in the productivity of labor, changed the 
pattern of exploitation to a greater reliance on relative 
surplus-value, which allowed the bourgeoisie to make 
strategic concessions to an organised and threatening 
working class on the issues of wages and working condi­
tions. Exploitative economic relations with overseas ter­
ritories also provided the bourgeoisie with another 
source of capital. Moreover, that class reinforced its grip 
on society through superstructural development. The 
hegemony of its “ruling ideas” at first neutralised, and 
then appropriated to its own ends, the legitimate organi­
sations of the working class, its political parties and trade 
unions. (Lukacs is an accurate observer of this process.)
In short, there was a tendency for the impetus towards 
revolutionary consciousness generated by the material 
conditions of life to weaken, while that consciousness 
had to contend with a new enemy -- itself a product of 
the changes referred to - revisionism.
Lenin’s response to this new situation was historically 
the most important. If revolutionary consciousness did 
not spring “spontaneously” from the contradictions at 
the material base (and the chances of this seemed to be 
diminishing), what was called for was a vanguard party 
to instill into the working class an adequate appreciation 
of their condition and revolutionary mission. The actual 
content of this revolutionary consciousness, far from ari­
sing from the working class and its social existence, was 
the product of intellectuals and was to be “imposed” on 
the class from outside. Lenin implicitly reversed the ori­
ginal relation between social being and consciousness, 
and this carried with it the danger, which he himself
strenuously resisted in his lifetime, of the actual condition 
of the masses becoming irrelevant to party theory.
If, in this new age of imperialism, the contradictions of 
capitalism impinged less on man’s daily experience, they 
found new expression in the trauma of world war. The 
less consolidated the bourgeois hegemony in a particular 
society, the less it could sustain this trauma, and in east­
ern Europe at least, its knell had apparently sounded in 
the first world war. It is from this perspective of social 
crisis, of what Lenin called “the actuality of the revolu­
tion,” that History and Class Consciousness was written. 
The period was both a salutary reminder that only a 
dialectical method was adequate to the understanding of 
the social process, and an invitation to assume, rather 
than establish empirically, the objective dynamics of 
revolution. It explains the assumption underlying History 
and Class Consciousness, that “history” had delivered the 
goods in the form of a revolutionary situation, and only 
the “subjective factor” remained problematical.
The extent to which the book is thus dated is the extent 
to which it is both a defective statement of the marxist 
dialectic and inadequate as a guide to theory and practice 
today. We have already seen how Lukacs emasculated the 
concept of praxis; we must now take note in passing of 
the resulting deformations of method, as these are in­
structive in the project of constructing an adequate theo­
ry of revolution for our own time.
One immediately raises the central problem of Lukacs’ 
approach by asking: what is the entry point into his sys­
tem for empirical economic, sociological and cultural 
data? Related to this question, and even more import­
antly: how are we to relate consciousness to the life 
process -- the experience - of the concrete individual in 
his class, his society and his time? In Lukacs’ case, the 
short answer is that a frozen form of Marx’s method 
has been raised above, and made no longer answerable 
to, concrete reality. This reality is relegated to the at­
tic: essentially empirical questions, and ones about the 
lives of real people (as opposed to the abstract entities 
which Lukacs moves around the stage of history), inclu­
ding those questions concerned with actual class struggle 
and consciousness, are given a priori answers. Dialectic 
method, in Ann Bastian’s formulation, “bases the cate­
gories of thought on the categories of reality; it may not 
reflect the conditions of existence in their immediacy, 
but it must reproduce reality in thought in order to to­
tally perceive it.” (Dissertation, p.53). This Lukacs fails 
to do.
The reflux that had already set in in western Europe 
by the time History and Class Consciousness was written 
threw a cold light on the inadequacy of pre-existing 
theory. It thereupon fell to Gramsci to begin a genuine 
advance towards a theory of consciousness. To under­
stand this advance, we must first look at the limits of 
Marx’s theory.
Marx’s base-superstructure model is a dialectical con­
ception which accords the superstructure a relative auto­
nomy rather than the status of a “mere emanation” of 
the base. However, only the base itself seems susceptible 
to rigorous scientific analysis since, as Wolpe points out, 
Marx specifically contrasts “the economic conditions of 
production which can be determined with the precision 
of a natural science [on the one hand], and the legal, 
political, religious, aesthetic or philosophic - in short, 
ideological forms [on the other].” (Socialist Register,
1970, p.274). As it stands then, Marx’s theory cannot 
tell us, in relation to the development of consciousness,
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how the various superstructural elements are to be taken 
into account.
The groundwork for Gramsci’s concept of hegemony 
was laid in The German Ideology, and both Lenin and Lu- 
kacs were aware of the determinant role of superstructu­
ral factors, without making any significant contribution 
to a theory of the superstructure. For Gramsci such a 
theory was indispensable for an understanding of class 
power in developed capitalist society, and hence, “the 
problems of superstructure should not be abandoned to 
themselves, to their spontaneous development, to a hap­
hazard and sporadic germination.” (Prison Notebooks, 
Lawrence & Wishart, p.247).
In order to overcome the bourgeois leadership of society, 
a new cultural, ethical and political counter-hegemonic 
initiative must be launched, and this in turn called for an 
analysis of all the superstructural factors at play in the 
development of consciousness. This counter-hegemonic 
initiative would have to contain many dimensions, which 
in sum would add up to a new and unified conception of 
the world, but which, seen severally, would negate the 
specific values and illusions upon which bourgeois leader­
ship is founded. The ideological struggle that Gramsci 
called for was not to be confined to the rarefied atmos- 
pher of high culture, but was to be conducted where 
people lived and worked, in the factories and workplaces 
themselves.
We have seen how history has added to, rather than 
replaced, the complexus of factors to be taken into ac­
count in the development of consciousness, and hence 
the challenge implicit in the Marxian concept of praxis 
seems more formidable than ever. If we ask what fact­
ors are relevant to our present era and how the determi­
nancy of each and the relationship between them is to be 
assessed, we face the added problem of grasping, before 
the owl of Minerva has spread its wings, the historical 
significance of factors in an ongoing process.
Goldmann suggests that the era of “imperialist capital­
ism” (about 1900 to the present) should be seen in two 
phases -- “crisis capitalism” from 1912 to 1950, and “or­
ganised capitalism” from 1950 to the present. The first 
salient feature of this latter period is a growing complex­
ity of class structure, which makes the use of the Marx­
ian analytic concept of class at once more difficult, and 
more crucial, to apply. The second salient feature is the 
growth of monopolies, and connected to that, the chan­
ge in the phenomenal form of the contradictions of capi­
tal: instead of oscillating between boom and - more or 
less severe -- depression, the economic system is main­
tained in a more stable state of “permanent crisis,” 
characterised by unemployment and low utilisation of 
productive capacity. The price of this “stability” is the 
ruling class’s greater dependence on the state apparatus 
to keep the economy functioning “normally” , and pro­
duction for waste and warfare.
To these features of our present era might be added two 
analytic problems. Firstly, the structural necessity of im­
perialism for metropolitan countries poses the problem 
of a global, as opposed to a national, class structure. Se­
condly, the thesis that neo-capitalism, in order to pacify 
the class struggle, engineers consent by means of psycho­
logical manipulation, points to the need for research in­
to the whole question of how social conditions and re­
lations impinge on the human psyche, and how the lat­
ter in turn is to be located in a determinant social pro­
cess.
If these aspects and their interconnections are rigorous­
ly analysed within the tradition of historical material­
ism, we shall have taken a long step towards a theory 
of the development of revolutionary consciousness 
which confronts the actual situation of the working class 
itself and of the minorities and excluded groups whose 
anti-capitalist struggles are so important today. Such a 
theory is clearly a precondition to the revolutionary pro­
ject itself.
CONCLUSION
The argument for a restoration of the empirical content 
of historical materialism is not an invitation to collapse 
into crass empiricism. The “facts” themselves explain 
nothing; they can only answer theoretically adequate 
questions. Still less does the suggestion that the dynam­
ics of the human psyche must be comprehended in a 
theory of consciousness validate psychologism in general, 
or the apologetics of bourgeois ego-psychology (which 
contrives to define the social dimension out of existence) 
in particular.
This said, it is apparent that the deficiencies in Lukacs’ 
treatment of consciousness must be made up by theore­
tical analysis and empirical investigation focussed in three 
areas:
1. An economic and sociological investigation of the 
structure of advanced capitalist society, including crisis 
theory, the structural aspects of imperialism (especially 
from the point of view of the imperialist metropolis), 
inter-imperialist trade and conflict, and class structure.
2. The development of a theory of the superstructure, 
the differentiation of its components and their articula­
tion. Such a theory would have to redefine and constant­
ly revise the relation between base and superstructure, 
for example, in revamping the notion of the state in the 
light of its new role in the economy.
3. The development of a “structural anthropology,” to 
use Sartre’s term, which locates the concrete man in his 
class and in his society, and which accounts for his con­
ditioning, needs and responses in that social milieu.
These foci are complex in themselves, and more com­
plex in the totality of their interrelations. Even to ap­
proach them is to grapple with the problem of develop­
ing methods adequate -- and answerable -- to their con­
tent. Moreover, theories constructed so abstractly have 
strictly limited usefulness; they are only a guide to, not 
a substitute for, specific analyses on the national level. 
This conceptual complexity, however, merely reflects 
a complex reality - the present seen as history. And un­
derstanding history, Labriola reminds us, is a question 
of
“explaining the connection and the complexus pre­
cisely insofar as it is a connection and a complexus. It is 
not merely a question of discovering and determining 
the social groundwork, and then of making men appear 
upon it like so many marionettes, whose threads are 
held and moved, no longer by Providence, but by eco­
nomic categories. These categories have themselves de­
veloped and are developing - because men change as to 
the capacity and the art of vanquishing, subduing and 
transforming and utilising natural conditions; because 
men change in spirit and attitude through the reaction 
of their tools upon themselves; because men change in 
their respective and co-associated relations; and because 
men change as individuals depending in various degrees 
upon one another. We have, in fine, to deal with history, 
and not with its skeleton.” (“Essays on the Materialist 
Conception of Hisotry, Kerr & Co., Chicago, 1908, pp. 
208-9.)
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